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Reaching hundreds of millions of the rural poor 
with sustainable savings and credit services: 
The role of rural & agricultural banks and their reform in Asia 
By 
H. D. Seibel, International Fund for Agricultural Development, Rome 
(H.Seibel@IFAD.org) 
Rural and agricultural banks, among them state-owned agricultural development banks 
(AgDBs) and cooperative banks, have a wide outreach in Asian countries. Their potential as 
retailers and wholesalers (through cooperatives, rural banks, NGOs) for providing sustainable 
savings deposit and credit services to the rural poor is enormous. Some examples:  
(a)  The quantative and qualitative outreach BRI Microbanking Division, with 25.1 million 
microsavings accounts and 2.6 million current microcredit accounts (at a profit!), 
surpasses that of some 10,000 formal and semiformal MFIs in Indonesia. 
(b) BAAC provides near-total coverage in terms of rural saver and agricultural borrower 
outreach in Thailand.  
(c)  The outreach of NABARD in India through rural banks, financial cooperatives and self-
help groups (SHGs) exceeds a hundred million. With regard to outreach to the very poor, 
NABARD has achieved spectacular success through its program Linking Banks and 
SHGs, expecting an outreach of a hundred million rural poor by 2008. 
(d)  In Nepal, IFAD and AsDB helped ADB/Nepal to build up a rural financial infrastructure 
of small farmer groups. With assistance from GTZ, 101 subproject offices have been 
transformed into autonomous savings and credit cooperatives (SFCLs), with an 
astonishing ratio of financial self-sufficiency of 117%. The success of the SFCLs in the 
fertile plains and the marginal hill areas is living proof of the compatability of outreach 
to the poorest and institutional sustainability even in a most difficult environment. 
 
Yet, the large majority of AgDBs in Asia and elsewhere are grossly underperforming and are 
a major drain on public resources. Therefore, they have been ignored by most donors in 
recent years.  However, experience in Asia shows that there is an enormous potential for 
reform. There is little chance that the small MFIs donors have been focussing on will even 
remotely come close to the Summit’s quantitative aims of outreach. Rural and agricultural 
banks must be included in our joint campaign to combat poverty, and every effort should be 
made to convince governments to transform rural and agricultural banks into viable and 
sustainable financial intermediaries with wide outreach to the rural poor. 
 
IFAD’s new initiative with CGAP, the World Bank, FAO, GTZ, regional development banks 
and the RACAs (Afraca, Apraca, Nenaraca) has focused on the potential as well as reform 
needs of AgDBs and increasingly attracted international attention. By including rural and 
agricultural banks in the Summit’s agenda, it is expected that synergies will be mobilized 
with the objective of substantially increasing access of the poor and very poor to sustainable 
financial services throughout Asia and the Pacific. The Microcredit Summit Campaign may play 
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1.  The Emerging Consensus on Rural and Microfinance 
 
For decades, financial repression has undermined the evolution of a diversified financial sector with 
cost-effective services available to all segments of the population. The rural and urban poor in the 
developing world have been the most affected. During the `70s and `80s, a consensus gradually 
evolved on the negative effects of financial repression: 
 
•  Rural areas have been severely underbanked; an effective rural financial infastructure is 
largely absent in many countries, particularly in marginal areas. 
•  Preferential credit programs have tended to curtail - rather than expand - outreach to small 
farmers and low-income people. These programs have undermined the health of 
agricultural development banks, cooperatives, and other institutions serving as credit 
channels.  
•  Interest rate regulation has prevented institutions from covering their costs, and had a 
severe, negative impact on access to financial services among the poor. 
•  Agricultural credit has all but dried up. 
•  A credit bias of government-owned development banks has led to a lack of savings deposit 
facilities, which are a first priority among many of the poor. 
•  Commercial banks collect savings in rural centers and siphon them off into urban areas. 
•  Informal financial institutions, which are formed by the local people through self-help, 
have been given little attention.  
•  In many countries, there is a lack of suitable legal forms for local financial institutions. 
•  This has prevented informal institutions from upgrading to registered local financial 
institutions. Thus, they remain small and isolated. 
•  In many countries, there a lack of non-mutualist local financial institutions, such as equity-
based rural banks. 
•  Rural and other microfinance institutions are not supervised, there are no prudential 
standards, and no enforcement mechanisms. This has had serious consequences, 
particularly for:  
◊  agricultural development banks, many of which are technically bankrupt; 
◊  cooperatives and credit unions, which were used as credit channels, resulting in 
widespread inefficiency, corruption and the breakdown of whole networks;  
◊  credit NGOs, which have been donor-driven, are barred from mobilizing deposits 
from the public and have shown a limited potential, except when transformed into a 
bank; 
◊  overall rural financial intermediation has been impeded. 
 
However, in all these fields, there have been notable new positive developments. Experience in a 
variety of countries has shown that with the right policies and strategies, stakeholder participation and 
donor coordination, the effectiveness of the rural financial system can be greatly improved. What  
would have considered as miracles only ten years ago, is now spreading in many regions of the world: 
market-friendly policy reform, AgDB restructuring, reform of the sector of financial cooperatives, 
commercialization and mainstreaming of credit NGOs, and linkages between formal and informal 
financial institutions. These are no longer mere exceptions, but pace-setting examples. However, 
depending on the political economy, wide differences still prevail between countries and regions. 
                                                      
1 For a concise presentation of the theme see: H. D. Seibel, Agricultural Development Banks: Close Them or 
Reform Them? Finance & Development, published by the International Monetary Fund, June 2000: 45-48. 
  
Box 1: 
Recent developments and continued shortcomings in rural and microfinance 
Topic  Recent developments  
in some countries 
Continued shortcomings  
in the majority of countries 
1. Policy environment   Macroeconomic stability; 
deregulation of interest rates; 
greater ease in setting up banks, branches, and 
local MFIs with lower capital requirements  
Inadequate policy & legal environment; 
Slow implementation of deregulation; 
Inadequate property rights and judicial 
procedures 
2. Agricultural development 
banks (AgDBs) 
Incipient reforms towards autonomy, operational 
viability and financial self-sufficiency, with or 
without privatization 
Lack of viability and self-reliance  
Dependent on budgetary allocations 
Political interference 
Inability to meet demand for credit, deposit 
facilities and insurance  
3.  Microfinance  institutions  New legal forms for commercially operating 
MFIs; increasing numbers of viable and self-
sustaining MFIs 
Lack of appropriate legal forms   
Standardized minimum capital requirements 
unadapted to local rural conditions 
4. Agricultural finance  Self-financing from profits and savings plus 
commercial microcredit replace preferential 
sources 
Self-financing and commercial credit from 
MFIs insufficient in meeting the demand for 
financial services 
5. Upgrading of nonformal 
financial institutions 
New legal framework provides opportunities for 
upgrading to formal levels and financial market 
integration  
The potential of upgrading millions of 
informal financial institutions has remained 
almost untapped 
6.  NGOs  Innovative approaches to poverty lending in 
repressive environments;  some successful 
conversions to formal intermediaries 
NGOs barred from deposit mobilization; 
Supply of easy money undermines the drive 
for self-reliance among credit NGOs  
7. MFI regulation and 
supervision 
Controversial discussion of the need for effective 
regulation and supervision of MFIs 
First-tier authorities unable to supervise MFIs  
AgDBs not properly regulated and supervised 
Lack of MFI self-regulation 
 
 
These new developments have created the foundation for a new consensus on rural and microfinance, 
particularly during the 90s
2: 
  
•  The poor can save, invest, and repay their loans. 
•  In order to develop their agricultural activities and microenterprises, prepare for 
emergencies and provide for the future, they need access to a range of microfinance 
services, with priority given to savings deposit facilities, credit and insurance. 
•  This requires a diversified financial infrastructure of competing institutions, and diverse 
strategies adjusted to a given economic and sociocultural context. 
•  Outreach can only be maximized by sustainable financial institutions, which cover all their 
costs, mobilize their own resources, protect their funds against erosion from inflation and 
non-repayment, and make a profit to finance their expansion. 
•  With sound practices, any type of financial institution can become sustainable and combine 
outreach and viability; but in most regions, institutions built on self-help and private 
ownership have better prospects.  
•  Through technical and financial assistance, donors can greatly contribute to the 
development of an efficient rural and microfinance sector, but must be effectively guided 
by the goals of viability and self-reliance set by rural and microfinance institutions. 
•  The main function of the State is to provide a conducive policy and regulatory framework, 
including deregulated interest rates, appropriate legal forms for small financial institutions, 
and effective delegated supervision. 
 
                                                      
2 H.D. Seibel, Financial Systems Development and Microfinance: Viable Institutions, Appropriate Strategies 
and Sustainable Financial Services for the Microeconomy. TZ-Verlag, Rossdorf, & GTZ, Eschborn, 1996 
(ISBN 3-88085-515-3) 
 
2 2.  Agricultural Development Banks: Ignore them, Close them, or Reform them? 
 
Historically, AgDBs were set up by their respective governments to promote rural development and 
alleviate poverty, though in actual fact, in a number of countries, they have tended to undermine rural 
finance and development. Donors provided funding and technical assistance. Embedded into a 
political economy of administrative planning, AgDBs have channeled scarce government and donor 
resources into financial as well as income-generating activities with the lowest rates of return – just 
the opposite of what financial intermediation, and development, should be about. 
 
For extended periods of time, neither their performance nor their impact were properly monitored. 
When donors finally did evaluate their support to AgDBs, many cut down or even stopped their 
assistance. In recent years, there has been a tendency to ignore AgDBs in programs of rural and 
microfinance systems development.  
 
On the negative side, AgDBs are weak or distressed in the large majority of countries. They fail to 
mobilize voluntary savings and domestic capital market resources. Mandated quota allocations from 
commercial banks set the wrong signals. Repayment rates are low; and transaction costs are high. 
Moreover, there has been a lack of supervision by regulatory agencies and donors. As a result, most 
AgDBs are unsustainable, and their outreach and growth restricted. In most cases, their contribution to 
poverty reduction has been minimal. Many are technically bankrupt; and in Africa and Latin America 
a number of them have actually been closed. 
 
On the positive side, AgDBs have continued to be major providers of rural and microfinance services 
in most countries through their branch network. Information on their outreach is spotty; but there is 
no doubt that in many countries, they major providers of rural financial services, sometimes the only 
one. Data compiled by the FAO for 1997 give a total of 53 million savers in 18 banks and 21 million 
borrowers in 26 banks. Most prominent is the case of Indonesia where BRI’s Microbanking Division, 
with 25 million savers and 2.6 million borrowers, exceeds the outreach of some 10,000 formal rural 
banks and semiformal MFIs (Table 1). Data are not disaggregated by client category and loan or 
deposit size. In the case of BRI, most savers are microdepositors, while loan sizes vary from US$5 to 
US$5,000 and include a vast number of microborrowers. 
 
Where AgDBs have been closed, their market share has usually not been taken over by other 
institutions. There are now some examples of successful AgDB reform, particularly in Asia. These 
indicate that reform may well be feasible and that their financial performance and outreach can be 
greatly increased. These few AgDBs have become instrumental in fighting rural poverty. 
 
There are thus three responses that have emerged in response to the failings of AgDBs: 
 
•  Ignoring AgDBs 
•  Closing AgDBs 
•  Reforming AgDBs 
 
Ignoring AgDBs and excluding them from the development agenda is at present the most common 
donor strategy. A variant of this is the practice of some donors to continue providing credit lines to 
unviable AgDBs and ignoring that this contributes to the perpetuation of an untenable situation. In 
some regions, governments pour vast amounts of funds into their state-owned development banks and 
into credit subsidies, ignoring the deleterious effect this has on institutional sustainability, outreach to 
the rural population including the poor, and the growth of the rural economy. This has fostered a 
culture of bad practices in rural finance, including interest rate subsidization, disbursement targets, 
and nonrepayment of loans. 
 
Table 1:  Saver and borrower outreach of selected rural and agricultural banks (1997) 
 






   (USD  million)
Agricultural Bank of Iran  4 200 000 600 000  2 500.0
Agricultural Bank of Sudan  25 000  25.0
Agricultural Cooperative Bank, Syria  400 000  1 600.0
Agricultural Credit Corporation, Jordan  7 000  120.0
Agricultural Development Bank, Nepal  400 000 400 000  185.0
Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan  700 000 750 000  1 300.0
Agricultural Finance Corporation, Zimbabwe  30 000  95.0
Banco de Desarrollo Agropecuario, Panama  13 000  90.0
Banco Nacional de Desarrollo Agricola, Honduras  50 000  11.0
Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Coops, Thailand  5 500 000 4 850 000  4 000.0
Bank BUKOPIN, Indonesia  7 000  800.0
Bank of Ceylon  4 000 000 600 000  1 100.0
Bank Pertanian, Malaysia  1 300 000 100 000  350.0
Bank Rakyat Indonesia  20 000 000 2 500 000  8 800.0
Banque Nationale de Développement Agricole, Mali  30 000 20 000  85.0
Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole, Morocco  150 000 450 000  1 100.0
Cooperative Central Bank Ltd., Cyprus  2 800   510.0
Development Bank of Ethiopia  3 000  200.0
Development Bank of Philippines  150 000 40 000  1 800.0
Federal Bank of Cooperatives, Pakistan  30 000  100.0
Land Bank, South Africa  25 000  1 200.0
Land Bank of the Philippines  800 000   2 700.0
National Bank of Commerce Ltd., Tanzania  450 000 3 000  120.0
Nat. Soc. Coop. d’Epargne et de Crédit Rural, Cameroun 4 000 400  0.5
People’s Bank, Sri Lanka  5 800 000 3 000 000  1 000.0
Principal Bank for Dev. and Agricultural Credit, Egypt  2 200 000 3 500 000  3 100.0
Union Bank of Nigeria PLC  2 000 000 150 000  250.0
Vietnam Bank for Agriculture & Rural Development  5 000 000 3 500 000  2 000.0
 
TOTAL no. of savers (18 banks)  52 686 800  
TOTAL no. of borrowers (26 banks)  21 053 400 
TOTAL loan outstanding ( 28 banks)    35 141.5
 
Source:   
AgriBank-Stat - http://www.fao.org/waicent/faoinfo/agricult/ags/AGSM/banks/invent.htm 
 
 
Closing AgDBs is a strategy particularly widespread in Latin America and West Africa. In many 
countries this has resulted in a situation where agricultural credit has all but dried up; local financial 
institutions, frequently barred by obstructive legislation, have been slow in moving into the void; and 
large segments of the rural population are left without any, or with totally inadequate, financial 
services.  
 
Reforming AgDBs in continued state ownership is a favored strategy applied in several Asian 
countries. Privatization as a strategy is more in favor in Latin America. A variant of this is a 
combination of state ownership with autonomous commercial management, eg, through a 
management contract with a private firm.  
 
In the interest of government finances and good use of scarce donor funds, our first proposal is: close 
them or reform them, but don’t continue to ignore them. If there is no scope for reform, for whatever 
reason, than AgDBs should be closed and make room for other developments in rural finance.  
4  
However, with the reform technologies available and the need for a diversity of competing institutions 
with financial services to smallholders, microentrepreneurs and the rural poor, we strongly advocate 
AgDB reform. AgDBs should be transformed into self-reliant, sustainable financial intermediaries: 
 
•  mobilizing domestic resources while providing positive real returns to their depositors;  
•  having their loans repaid and their costs covered from their operational income;  
•  producing sufficient retained earnings to offset the erosion of their resources from inflation 
and to finance their expansion; and  
•  continually increasing their saver and borrower outreach and the quality of their services to 
all segments of the rural population including the poor. 
 
Depending on the political economy of a country, ownership may be private, cooperative, public or 
mixed. AgDB reform deserves high priority in the fight against poverty. AgDBs and donors should 
therefore cooperate in generating the required political will. In the absence of the political will, donors 
should stop undermining rural finance by using AgDBs as credit channels. 
 
 
3.  Agricultural Development Bank Reform: Three Cases
3 
 
Three examples of the reform of the rural microfinance operations of AgDBs are given below, all 
from Asia. They differ widely in their approach, indicating that there is no single best way of 
reforming AgDBs:  
 
•  The Microbanking Division of Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) as a case of big-bang reform 
following the deregulation of interest rates in June 1983, when BRI was given the option of 
closing its network of rural units or standing on its own feet. BRI provides credit to 
millions of rural people and savings services to tens of millions - at a profit! Its challenge: 
Can BRI lower its interest rate on loans and further increase its outreach? 
•  Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) in Thailand,  as a case of 
gradual reform. At low interest rates, BAAC covers its costs and reaches all rural 
households with adequate savings and credit services: Its current challenge: Can it maintain 
its viability and withstand political pressures? 
•  Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN), which is transforming the operations of 
its Small Farmer Development Project into autonomous member-owned local financial 
institutions. Its challenge: Can it expand financial services and cooperative ownership by 
the poor throughout the country. 
                                                      
3  Basic reading: C. Gonzalez-Vega & D.H. Graham, State-Owned Agricultural Development Banks: 
Lessons and Opportunities for Microfinance. Economics and Sociology Occasional Paper No. 2245, Rural 
Finance Program, Dept. of Agricultural Economics, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210-1099, 
June 1995; J. Yaron & S. Charitenenko, Making the Transition from State Agricultural Credit Institution to 
Rural Financial Intermediary: Role of the State and Reform Options. Washington DC, The World Bank, 1999. 
J. Yaron & S. Charitenenko, Improving the Outreach and Sustainability of State-Owned Rural Finance 
Institutions: Issues and Policy Implications. Pp. 413-428 in: M. Zeller & M. Sharma, eds., Innovations in 
Microfinance for the Rural Poor: Exchange of Knowledge and Implications for Policy. Proceedings of the 
International Workshop in Accra (1998) – DSE/IFPRI/IFAD/Bank of Ghana. Feldafing, DSE, 1999 
5  
Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI Microbanking Division)
4: 
Within a policy framework of financial deregulation, the granting of management autonomy 
and carefully-crafted financial products have turned BRI into the largest and most successful 
provider of financial services to the poor and non-poor in the developing world. This has set 
new standards for AgDBs – they can be reformed!  – and the microfinance industry: 




BRI, Indonesia: The agricultural development bank which revolutionized rural finance 
 
The case of BRI, IFAD’s partner in P4K, is evidence that, in a deregulated policy environment, the 
microcredit operations of an ailing government-owned agricultural development bank can be 
transformed into a highly profitable, self-reliant microfinance intermediary. Since 1984, BRI has 
evolved into a major microfinance provider. Massive staff retraining in the new microbanking culture, 
with its new financial services and incentive schemes, was of crucial importance. Its 3,700 local units 
serve some 25.1 million savings accounts and 2.6 million borrowers (July 2000). With non-targeted 
loans of from $5 to $5000 at rural market rates of interest and unrestricted deposit services, it reaches 
out to vast number of the poor and the non-poor. Making good use of a start-up liquidity injection, it 
has fully replaced external funds with local savings since 1989. Profits of the now autonomous 
Microbanking Division of BRI were $150 million in 1999. 
The ultimate test came with the Asian financial crisis. When the Indonesian banking system collapsed, 
BRI’s Microbanking Division remained profitable. At the peak of the crisis, from June to August 
1998, the local units attracted 1.29 million new savers during the three-month period. At the same 
time, demand for credit stagnated because of a lack of confidence in the future. Since then, the 
division’s 12-month loss ratio has been continually dropping to 1.35 percent (July 2000), substantially 
below its already low long-term loss ratio (1984-99) of 2.1 percent. Savings balances in the units now 
exceed loans outstanding by $ 1.45 billion (a recurrent problem during the 100-year history of BRI 
and rural financial institutions elsewhere), requiring new strategies to recycle them within the rural 
economy – perhaps BRI’s greatest challenge. 
 
Numerous lessons can be drawn from BRI's experience: 
(1)  Financial sector policies work and create an environment conducive to financial innovations. 
(2)  The political will to reform can be created; and political interference can be kept at bay. 
(3)  With attractive savings and credit products, appropriate staff incentives, and an effective system of 
internal regulation and supervision, rural microfinance can be profitable. 
(4)  The poor can save, and rural institutions can mobilize their savings cost-effectively. 
(5) Without credit-biased incentives, the demand for savings deposit services exceeds the demand for 
credit by a wide margin. 
(6)  Incentives for timely repayment work. 
(7) Transaction costs can be lowered, and outreach to the poor increased by catering for both the poor 
and the non-poor alike, with their demands for widely differing deposit and loan sizes. 
(8)  Outreach to vast numbers of low-income people is compatible with financial self-sufficiency.  
(9) Agricultural development banks can be transformed into profitable and sustainable providers of 
microsavings and microcredit services. 
 
 
                                                      
4 H. D. Seibel, How an Agricultural Development Bank Revolutionized Rural Finance: The Case of Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia. IFAD Rural Finance Working Paper No. B5, Doc. #48881 
 
6  
 Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operatives (BAAC), Thailand: 
BAAC has gone through four major phases of reform: 1966-74, laying the foundation for 
individual lending with joint liability; 1975-87, expanding its lending operations through 
access to commercial bank and donor funds while greatly reducing loan channelling through 
cooperatives; 1988-96, striving for viability and self-reliance, under conditions of controlled 
interest rates, through savings mobilization, improved loan recovery and increased staff 
productivity; since 1997, adjusting to prudential regulation by the central bank and 
diversifying into non-agricultural lending. Gradual reform has resulted in the largest outreach 
achieved by any AgDB, to 88% of farm households, combined with viability. 
 
Box 3:  BAAC, Thailand: The gradual reformer  
BAAC’s perennial reform has been guided by two, sometimes conflicting, objectives: outreach to all 
farm households as its political mandate; and financial viability in the bank’s own interest. Important 
elements in the reform process have been:  
(1) Government respect for the bank’s considerable operational autonomy. 
(2) A corporate culture emphasizing cost-effectiveness, productivity and efficiency. 
(3) Decentralization and expansion of branch network operating as profit centers. 
(4) Individual lending through joint liability groups, as a financial technology attuned to Thai culture.  
(5) Substantial improvements in portfolio quality, which created depositor confidence. 
(6) A radical shift in the financial resource base to rural savings mobilization. 
For full self-reliance, the bank would have to increase its lending rate from 12% to 15-16%. This is 
difficult in the political climate ofearly 2001, where the bank is threatened by a debt moratorium. 
BAAC has demonstrated how gradual reform can be carried through in periods of financial 
repression, with directed credit, interest rate ceilings and mandated agricultural lending quotas. Under 
these restrictions, BAAC expanded its outreach, forced cost-efficiency upon its staff, and prepared the 
ground for deposit mobilization. The reform agenda is still unfinished:  
(1) With the emergence of private depositors as major stakeholders, ownership of BAAC stock might 
be diversified, with adequate representation of the new shareholders on the Board of BAAC.  
(2) Lending rates need to be fully liberalized and re-aligned to reflect the true costs. 
(3) BAAC needs a new, performance-related management information system (MIS) which also 
enables field-level managers to track the performance of both savings and loans of a particular client. 
(4) Performance-related staff incentives, presently under pilot-testing, need to be implemented 
OUTREACH March 2000    
Lending outreach    
Number of borrower clients  45.0 million   
% of farm households in Thailand  88%   
Loans outstanding  US$ 5.7 billion   
Average loan size (farmer clients)  US$ 2,042   
Savings outreach    
Number of deposits by individuals  8.3 million   
Deposit volume (incl. Institutions)  US$ 4.5 billion   
Average deposit size  US$ 246   
Market share in rural deposits  15%   
SUSTAINABILITY March 2000    
Capital adequacy  Capital/net loans  9.1%
Portfolio quality  Past dues/loans outstanding  16.5
Operational self-sufficiency  Income/operational cost  228%
Financial self-suficiency  Income/operational cost and cost of funds  98%
Self-sufficiency in funds  Loan to deposit ratio  81
Efficiency  Administrative cost/average loans outstanding  3.1%
Productivity  Number of active borrowers/credit officer  473
Source:  Klaus Maurer, AgDB Reform: The Case of BAAC. IFAD Doc. #46498. 
 
7 Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN)
5: 
In Nepal, IFAD up to 1992 and the Asian Development Bank thereafter assisted ADBN to 
establish an infrastructure of small farmer groups, which in turn formed intergroups and 
management committees under sub-project offices. Supported by GTZ, ADBN has transformed 
these into autonomous local financial institutions. An unsustainable project is being 
successfully transformed into vibrant financial cooperatives: a highly successful model for the 
very poor in marginal hill areas!  
 
Box 4:   
ADBN, Nepal:  
Transforming an unsustainable credit program into viable local financial intermediaries 
Since 1975 the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal has built up its Small Farmer Development 
Project (SFDP), a subsidized credit program targeted at the poor. With assistance from IFAD as the 
first major donor until 1992 and the Asian Development Bank thereafter, farmers were organized in 
some 25,000 small groups. With repayment rates, since 1980, of 39-54% and a savings ratio 
consistently below 1 %, plus high transaction costs, SFDP was found unsustainable, and growth of 
outreach to poor farmers remained restricted. However, the credit line to ADBN had enabled poor 
farmers including women to build up a group structure. In the more liberal policy environment of the 
1990s, ADBN, assisted by GTZ and inspired by a charismatic Nepali leader, responded positively to 
the farmers’ initiatives and embarked on a new strategy. The groups under each subproject office are 
being transformed into autonomous Small Farmer Cooperatives Ltd. (SFCL), which mobilize savings 
and cover their own costs. The results to date have been spectacular. By 2000, 101 SFCLs had been 
transformed, with 56,000 members (33% women), low overhead costs and a financial self-sufficiency 
ratio of an astonishing 118% (1999/2000) – up from 38.8% in 1997/98.
6 Women’s SFCLs are 
generally stronger than men’s. Most remarkable is that SFCLs in marginal hill areas (117.3%) are 
equally self-sufficient as in the plains (117.7%). The remaining 280 subproject offices are to be 
transformed within the next five years. Most remarkable: Some SFCLs are now receiving their limited 
banking licence, which allows them to further increase their services and outreach. At the same time, 
restructuring ADBN into a viable bank is under consideration. 
Through user ownership and vigorous savings mobilization, unsustainable credit programs can be 
transformed into networks of viable local financial intermediaries. A recent GTZ study concluded: 
(1)  SFCLs have the potential to fully cover their costs through internally generated income. Full 
financial self-sufficiency can be expected earliest after two years of transformation. On average, 
financial self-sufficiency is achieved in most cases three to five years after transformation. 
(2)  SFCLs are operating on modest transaction costs due to the cooperative-style of management. 
Even in marginal hill areas, SFCLs achieve full financial self-sufficiency.  
(3)  SFCLs are increasingly replacing external through internal financial resources, indicating that 
sustainable microfinance institutions tend to be savings-based than credit-driven. 
(4)  SFCLs have to strengthen their capital base to adequately cover their risks. 
                                                      
5 H. D. Seibel & G. Ketterer, Small Farmer Development Project Nepal: an Evaluation. GTZ, Eschborn, 1996; 
H. D. Seibel & M. Mortuza, Rural Financial Systems Development in Nepal. GTZ, Eschborn, 1995; U. Wehnert 
& R. Shakya, Are Small Farmer Co-operatives Ltd. (SFCLs) Viable Microfinance Organisations? Working 
Paper No. 1, RUFIN, ADBN & GTZ, Kathmandu, Jan. 2001. 
6 From the ADBN/GTZ sample study: The 33 SFCLs' average financial self-sufficiency ratio for the 
year 1996/97 was 38.8%; it doubled in 1997/98 to 79.2% and increased to 117.6% in 1999/2000. 
Except for the newly transferred SFCLs with one year of operation, all SFCLs managed to achieve the 
100% level. The Financial Self Sufficiency Ratio (PEARLS) was calculated as: total income - 
(subsidies + other income) / (total operational expenses + total provision + total financial cost + 
imputed cost of capital - other expenses). 
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4.   Reforming Agricultural Development Banks 
 
How best to initiate reform is an issue to be discussed in a participatory manner, in two fora: the 
donor community and associations of AgDBs. In order to agree on a conceptual framework, division 
of labour and steps to be followed, some initiatives have been taken, as indicated below: 
 
  A joint IFAD/FAO/World Bank initiative on the restructuring of AgDBs
7 
  The establishment of a CGAP Working Group on AgDB Reform (Abidjan, June 1999), 
comprising members from AfDB (Abidjan); AsDB (Manila); GTZ and KfW (Germany),; 
OECF (Japan); SDC and SODC (Switzerland); UNCDF/UNDP (New York); World Bank 
(Washington) 
  Discussions during AsDB’s Regional Workshop on Microfinance Development Strategy 
(Manila, September 1999) 
  A presentation to the Donors’ Working Group on Financial Sector Development (Rome, 
September 1999) 
  Discussions during the Third Annual Seminar on New Development Finance (Frankfurt, 
September 1999) 
  A presentation to the7th CGAP Meeting (Endinburgh, June 2000) 
  A presentation to the Micro and Rural Finance Workshop (Abuja, September 2000) 
  Preliminary agreements with the regional agricultural credit associations (RACAs, which 
are partner organizations of FAO and IFAD): Afraca (Nairobi), Apraca (Bangkok) and 
Nenaraca (Amman) on workshops to initiate reform among member AgDBs; and 
presentations at their respective regional and subregional workshops in Tunis, Abuja, 
Nairobi and Bangkok during 2000 
 
New studies of AgDBs are being undertaken by: 
 
  AfDB on development finance institutions in Africa;  
  AsDB on the role of central banks in microfinance in 12 countries in Asia;  
  FAO on CNCA in Morocoo;  
  IFAD on BAAC in Thailand
8;  
 
During 2000, regional and sub-regional workshops on AgDB reform are being held AFRACA for 
Africa (Abuja 4.-7.4.; Dakar 10.-12.5.; Arusha 5.-9.6.; Douala 4.-6.7.; Maseru 8.-10.8.; Nairobi 28.-
29.11); by APRACA for Asia (Beijing 18.-19.10.; Bangkok 20.-23.11.); and by NENARACA for 
North Africa and the Near East (Tunis 30.5.-1.6.) - with the following agenda: 
 
  Initiate a participatory process among AgDBs, RACAs and donor agencies 
  Review AgDB reform experiences and needs 
  Work out appropriate strategies of AgDB reform 
  Examine the demand for consultancy services to AgDB member institutions 
  Work out a coordinated approach to AgDB reform in a participatory way 
  Identify AgDBs for pilot reform initiatives, starting with pre-feasibility studies 
                                                      
7 In an exchange of letters of 14 June 2000 and 19 July 2000, respectively, the presidents of IFAD and the 
World Bank agreed that “… it would be timely for the World Bank and IFAD to collaborate more closely to 
help interested member states to develop the potential of these poorly performing institutions” (IFAD); and that 
“we fully agree on the need to substantially enhance agricultural and rural development through either closure 
or revitalization of agricultural development banks”(World Bank). FAO has longstanding technical 
collaboration agreements with both the World Bank and IFAD and the proposed collaborative work 
with AgDB reform falls within these arrangements. Discussions with the regional development banks 
are under way. 
8 Agricultural Development Bank Reform: The Case of the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives 
(BAAC), Thailand. IFAD Rural Finance Working Paper No. B6, Doc #46498 
9   Assist member AgDBs in accessing donor support for reform 
  Support networking and exchange of experience on AgDB reform among member 
countries 
  Disseminate the results through workshops and publications 
 
These discussions are to prepare the ground for a number of projects in RACA member countries and 
for donor agreements on their support. It is expected that the generation of political will to reform 
AgDBs will require a multidonor approach, including prolonged and concerted negotiations by the 
IMF, the World Bank, IFAD, FAO, the regional development banks and other multilateral and 
bilateral donors with the concerned governments. 
 
Box 5: Afraca’s AgDB Reform Initiative 
(i) The governments have to take a decision to reform their ailing AgDBs…(ii) Adequate reform strategies should be 
worked out…  (iv) The new banks should be operationally autonomous… (x) The new bank should endeavour to attain 
financial sustainability through charging market interest rates, savings mobilization, retained earnings… (Communique of the Afraca 
workshop in Abuja, April 2000) 
 
Box 6: Nenaraca’s AgDB Reform Initiative 
(i) Nenaraca should write to member banks, asking which banks may be interested in undertaking a pre-feasibility study of 
restructuring and reform. (ii) The banks may approach donors for assistance in carrying out the pre-feasibility studies. (iii) 
Nenaraca will actively participate, or initiate, donor coordination in all phases of support to AgDB reform. 
(Recommendations of the Nenaraca workshop in Tunis, June 2000) 
 
Box 7: APRACA’s AgDB Reform Initiative 
To maximize their outreach, AgDBs… must cover all their costs, mobilize their own resources, protect their funds and assets 
against erosion from inflation and non-repayment of loans, and make a profit to finance their expansion…. The recent 
financial crisis in Asia has highlighted the need for closer scrutiny and regulation of financial organizations, including 
AgDBs and MFIs…. The challenge is to find a way for all parties involved to work together for the continuous delivery of 
sustainable financial services by helping improve their viability and outreach to the poor. (APRACA-NACF Regional 
Conference in Bangkok, November 2000) 
 
 
5.  A Planning Framework for Rural and Agricultural Bank reform 
 
The following objective of AgDB reform is suggested: 
 
Agricultural development banks are transformed into viable and sustainable providers of 
financial services to all segments of the rural population, including the poor. 
 
To reach this objective, the following key results (see Annex 1) are to be achieved:  
 
  activating the political will to reform or to close down 
  adequate reform strategies  
  an effective planning process 
  operational autonomy and freedom from political interference 
  an appropriate legal and regulatory framework with prudential norms 
  financial restructuring (preceded by  consolidation of the bad debts of state-owned and 
other enterprises) 
  organizational restructuring & staff retraining 
  an effective delivery system, with branches as profit centres  
  demand-driven financial products 
  operational and financial sustainability 
  effective internal control and external supervision 
 
10 To facilitate a participatory planning process among AgDBs a framework (with accompanying 
worksheets) has been prepared.
9 (Annex 1). 
 
AgDB reform exceeds the capacity of single donors and will require partnerships between several 
financial and technical assistance agencies. Close cooperation of donors with agencies such as the 
RACAs, CGAP and others is expected to contribute to the generation of the political will to reform. 
IFAD’s special focus would be on the reform of the AgDBs’ microsavings, microcredit and other 
microfinance services to smallholders, micro-entrepreneurs and the poor, including their self-help 
groups, informal financial institutions, business associations and supporting NGOs. The Microcredit 
Summit Campaign may play an important role in generating the political will to transform rural and 
agricultural banks into viable and sustainable financial intermediaries with an outreach to hundreds of 
millions of the rural poor. 
 
                                                      
9 S. I. Ijioma, Sub-Regional Activities for 2000: Agricultural Development Banks – Ignore, Reform or 
Liquidate. Afraca News no. 31, April 2000: 8-9. M. R. Mustafa, Restructuring Agricultural Banks in the NENA 
Region. Paper presented at the Nenaraca Workshop in Tunis, 30/5-1/6, 2000. 
11 Annex 1: 
Rural and Agricultural Development Bank Reform 
A participatory planning framework 
 
Objective: 
Rural and agricultural development banks (AgBDs) are 
transformed into sustainable providers of financial services 
to the rural population 
 
 
Key results and outputs:   
1.The political will to reform the AgDB is activated: 
1.1The political decision is taken by government to reform its 
AgDB 
1.2A participatory planning process involving all stakeholders 
is agreed upon 
1.3The AgDB management and the stakeholders agree on the 
mandate and market of the AgDB 
 
 
2.Adequate reform strategies are worked out: 
2.1Alternative reform strategies are examined including: 
2.2government-owned AgDB under autonomous management 
2.3government-owned AgDB under commercial bank 
management 
2.4full or partial privatization 
2.5transformation of microbanking operations into user-owned 
local financial institutions  
2.6closure or fusion 
2.7Appropriate reform strategies are selected 
2.8Adequate process technologies are developed 
2.9Implementation phases of the reform process are determined 
and periodically revised 
2.10Logistic support of multilateral institutions is secured 




3.The planning process is implemented: 
3.1A feasibility study is carried out 
3.2An operational plan for the implementation of the reform 
process is prepared 
3.3External technical and financial support of  the reform 
process is mobilized and coordinated 
3.4The process of restructuring and reform is monitored 
 
 
4.Operational autonomy is effective:  
4.1The AgDB is granted operational autonomy 
4.2A commercially experienced, politically independent 
general manager is appointed 
4.3The Central Bank or Bank Superintendency enforces the 
attainment of operational autonomy 
 
 
5.An appropriate legal and regulatory framework is provided: 
5.1A dialogue is initiated on the policy, legal and regulatory 
framework conducive to AgDB reform 
5.2The ADB law is revised 
5.3Politically motivated loan forgiveness is excluded by law 
5.4Prudential norms are defined and enforced 
 
 
12 6.The AgDB’s finances are restructured: 
6.1The portfolio is cleaned 
6.2The bank is recapitalized 
 
 
7.The bank structure is reorganized: 
7.1Microfinance services are organized in an autonomous 
corporate division 
7.2Savings deposits are recycled among the microfinance units 
7.3Branches are decentralized into profit centers 
7.4The branch network is expanded 
7.5Outreach is expanded to the poor and their self-help groups 
 
1.  
8.Effective delivery schemes are operational: 
8.1Viable wholesale schemes are operational 
8.2Linkages with self-help groups, informal financial 
institutions and NGOs are initiated if feasible 
8.3Viable retail schemes are operational 
 
 
9.Effective financial services are offered according to demand: 
9.1Savings are mobilized through appropriate savings products 
and collection services 
9.2Interest rates on savings are adequate, with positive real 
returns 
9.3Credit products with appropriate terms and collection 
services are provided 
9.4Insurance and other financial products are provided 
 
 
10.Financial sustainability is attained: 
10.1Viability is attained through adequate interest rate spreads 
and adequate repayment performance 
10.2Self-reliance is attained through savings mobilization and 
retained earnings 
10.3Financial self-sustainability is attained through adequate 
returns on capital 
 
 
11.Human resources are developed: 
11.1Staff selection procedures are established for the hiring of 
appropriate staff 
11.2Training and retraining schemes are established to 
inculcate the reformed operational practices 
11.3Staff training and retraining is implemented on a 
continuous basis 
11.4Staff incentive schemes are operational 




12.Internal and external supervision are effective: 
12.1International accounting standards are operational 
12.2Prudential norms are observed 
12.3A MIS with effective on-time monitoring of loans and 
prompt action taken is operational 
12.4Internal supervision is operational 
12.5External supervision is operational 
12.6Effective supervision services to wholesale clients are 




13 Annex 2:              #153681 
 
Asia and Pacific Region 
Microcredit Summit Meeting of Councils 
 
New Delhi, India 
1-5 February 2001 
 
Associate Session:  
Reaching hundreds of millions of the rural poor 
with sustainable savings and credit services: 
The role of rural & agricultural banks in Asia 
 





(1)  International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Rome: 
Mobilize your own resources, cover your costs and reach out to hundreds 
of millions of the rural poor: The role of rural & agricultural banks in 
microfinance and rural poverty alleviation in Asia  
 
(2)  National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), 
India: Linking self-help groups, NGOs and rural banks: Will NABARD in 
India reach a hundred million of the very poor?  
 
(3)  Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC), Thailand: 
The bank that covers its costs and reaches all smallholders with adequate 
savings and credit services: How did BAAC in Thailand do it at low interest 
rates?  
 
(4)  Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), Indonesia:  
BRI in Indonesia provides credit to millions of rural people and savings 
services to tens of millions - at a profit! Can BRI lower its interest rate on 
loans and further increase its outreach?  
 
(5)  Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN), Nepal: 
Sustainable financial services to the very poor in marginal areas: how 
ADBN transformed its Small Farmers Development Project into self-reliant 
local financial intermediaries owned and managed by the poor  
 
(6) Donors: 
Sustainable banking for the rural poor in Asia: the role of donors, APRACA 
and the Microcredit Summit  
14  
Associate session: 
Sunday, 4 February 2001, 1:15-2:15 p.m. 
Reaching hundreds of millions of the rural poor 
with sustainable savings and credit services: 
The role of rural & agricultural banks and their reform in Asia 
By 
H. D. Seibel, International Fund for Agricultural Development, Rome 
(H.Seibel@IFAD.org) 
Rural and agricultural banks, among them state-owned agricultural development banks 
(AgDBs) and cooperative banks, have a wide outreach in Asian countries. Their potential as 
retailers and wholesalers (through cooperatives, rural banks, NGOs) for providing sustainable 
savings deposit and credit services to the rural poor is enormous. Some examples:  
(a)  The quantative and qualitative outreach BRI Microbanking Division, with 25.1 million 
microsavings accounts and 2.6 million current microcredit accounts (at a profit!), 
surpasses that of some 10,000 formal and semiformal MFIs in Indonesia. 
(b) BAAC provides near-total coverage in terms of rural saver and agricultural borrower 
outreach in Thailand.  
(c)  The outreach of NABARD in India through rural banks, financial cooperatives and self-
help groups (SHGs) exceeds a hundred million. With regard to outreach to the very poor, 
NABARD has achieved spectacular success through its program Linking Banks and 
SHGs, expecting an outreach of a hundred million rural poor by 2008. 
(d)  In Nepal, IFAD and AsDB helped ADB/Nepal to build up a rural financial infrastructure 
of small farmer groups. With assistance from GTZ, 101 subproject offices have been 
transformed into autonomous savings and credit cooperatives (SFCLs), with an 
astonishing ratio of financial self-sufficiency of 117%. The success of the SFCLs in the 
fertile plains and the marginal hill areas is living proof of the compatability of outreach 
to the poorest and institutional sustainability even in a most difficult environment. 
 
Yet, the large majority of AgDBs in Asia and elsewhere are grossly underperforming and are 
a major drain on public resources. Therefore, they have been ignored by most donors in 
recent years.  However, experience in Asia shows that there is an enormous potential for 
reform. There is little chance that the small MFIs donors have been focussing on will even 
remotely come close to the Summit’s quantitative aims of outreach. Rural and agricultural 
banks must be included in our joint campaign to combat poverty, and every effort should be 
made to convince governments to transform rural and agricultural banks into viable and 
sustainable financial intermediaries with wide outreach to the rural poor. 
 
IFAD’s new initiative with CGAP, the World Bank, FAO, GTZ, regional development banks 
and the RACAs (Afraca, Apraca, Nenaraca) has focused on the potential as well as reform 
needs of AgDBs and increasingly attracted international attention. By including rural and 
agricultural banks in the Summit’s agenda, it is expected that synergies will be mobilized 
with the objective of substantially increasing access of the poor and very poor to sustainable 
financial services throughout Asia and the Pacific. The Microcredit Summit Campaign may play 
an important role in generating the necessary political will. 
 
 
 
15 